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BARRY V. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE CO.: A RE-INTERPRETATION OF
THE BOYCOTT EXCEPTION TO THE McCARRAN ACT
Under the protective auspices of the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance
Regulation Act1 of 1945 (McCarran Act), the insurance industry has avoid-
ed many of the federal laws that regulate other national industries. In
particular, insurance companies have escaped the brunt of federal antitrust
laws. 2
Regulation of the "business of insurance" is largely vested in state
governments under the provisions of the McCarran Act.3 The Act also
provides that the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts-
the basic federal antitrust statutes-are only "applicable to the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
4
Thus, regulation of the insurance business is left to the states, and they are
permitted to preempt federal antitrust requirements by adopting their own
insurance regulations. 5 Because the states have exercised their preemptive
powers, federal antitrust regulation of the insurance business has been
displaced by state laws.
6
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970). The McCarran Act states in pertinent part:
§ 1011. Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest ....
§ 1012 . . . (b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That. . . the Sherman Act,
• . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by State law.
§1013. . . (b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
2. See generally Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance Companies: The Disappearing
McCarran Act Exemption, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1340; Note, Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws
to the Insurance Industry, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1088 (1962); Comment, The McCarran Act's
Antitrust Exemption for "the Business of Insurance": A Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REV.
329 (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970). See note I supra.
4. Id. § 1012(b).
5. See Mcllhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976); H.R. REP.
No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1945] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 670, 672.
6. The extent of state regulation that is necessary to preempt federal control has been a
subject of considerable debate. See Comment, supra note 2, at 330. One commentator has
concluded that:
Certain minimum standards must be met in order for the McCarran-Ferguson Act to
oust federal jurisdiction in the antitrust area. The particular state involved must first
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In recent years there has been considerable dissatisfaction with the
present system of insurance regulation resulting in a movement toward
greater federal control.7 According to one analysis, the McCarran Act "has
perpetuated a crazy-quilt pattern of regulation that has 50 state insurance
agencies enforcing different state laws with widely varying degrees of
effectiveness and zeal over a business that is national in scope."' There
remains an inherent incongruity in a system which exempts insurance
companies from the federal standards to which other similar businesses are
subject. Most importantly, the antitrust exemption places potentially harm-
ful anticompetitive abuses beyond the purview of those federal laws which
were designed to control them.
The movement toward greater federal regulation in the insurance area
has proceeded along several fronts. 9 This Note will examine one potential
means of expanding federal antitrust control, the so-called "boycott excep-
tion" to the McCarran Act.10 Recent case law suggests that the boycott
exception may allow the federal government to play a greater role in
insurance regulation. If that role is to be effective, the proper scope of the
boycott exception must be firmly established.
I. REVITALIZING THE BOYCOTT EXCEPTION: TRANSNATIONAL REEXAMINED
The text of the McCarran Act itself provides one explicit exception to
its general antitrust exemption for insurance. Section 1013(b) maintains the
applicability of the Sherman Act to "any agreement to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation."'" An expansive
interpretation of this boycott exception would provide a potentially powerful
means of effectuating federal antitrust policy in the insurance area. A recent
have a statutory scheme of regulation .... Secondly, . . . there must be at least
potentially effective enforcement by the state. Furthermore, the enforcement must be
based on similar considerations to that of the federal act.
Atwell, The McCarran-Ferguson Act-A Deceptive Panacea?, 5 FORUM 339, 344 (1969); see R.
KEETON, BASic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 541-42 (1971).
7. See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 915, 920 (E.D. La.),
aff'd, 355 U.S. 22 (1957); Johnson, Insurance Regulation at the Crossroads, 1977 INS. L.J. 7;
Note, Insurance Regulation and Antitrust Exemptions: McCarran-Ferguson, the Boycott Ex-
ception, and the Public Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 140 (1973); Comment, supra note 2;
Comment, State Regulation Under the McCarran Act, 47 TULANE L. REV. 1069 (1973); Note,
The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1271
(1976).
8. Freed, Federal Agencies Move to Expand Influence Over Insurance Firms, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
9. Currently, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission are considering curtailing
federal antitrust exemptions for insurance. Id. at 16, col. 1. By narrowly interpreting the term,
"business of insurance," as used in the McCarran Act, the courts have subjected peripheral
and non-insurance activities of insurance companies to federal antitrust regulation. See SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970), quoted in note I supra.
11. Id.
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decision from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has taken a signifi-
cant step in that direction. In Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.'2 the court emphasized the role of the boycott exception as "the all
purpose safety valve" of the McCarran Act. 13 The court held that insurance
companies which allegedly refused to sell medical malpractice insurance to
a dissatisfied customer of another company were not exempt from the
federal antitrust laws. By characterizing an alleged conspiratorial refusal to
sell to a potential consumer as a boycott within the meaning of the McCarran
Act boycott exception, the court concluded that the aggrieved party was
entitled to seek relief under the federal antitrust laws. 14
In reaching its holding in Barry, the court of appeals was compelled to
reject an earlier line of case authorities beginning in 1966 with Transnation-
al Insurance Co. v. Rosenlund15 which placed a highly restrictive interpre-
tation upon the boycott exception. If a more expansive reading is to gain
acceptance, the narrow interpretation of Transnational and its progeny must
first be clearly analyzed and discarded. As evidenced by the strong dissent
in Barry16 and recent cases relying upon Transnational,17 there is little
consensus in the courts on the proper scope of the boycott exception.18
Despite the seemingly comprehensive wording of the boycott excep-
tion, 19 the Transnational court imposed an important restriction upon its
12. 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 391 (1977) (No. 77-240, 1977 Term).
13. 555 F.2d at 11-12. The plaintiff, a Rhode Island physician, brought a class action suit
against four insurance companies who sold medical malpractice insurance in Rhode Island.
After becoming dissatisfied with certain changes in one company's malpractice coverage, the
plaintiff and other doctors attempted to purchase coverage from other insurers. These
companies refused to sell them malpractice insurance of any kind. The plaintiff alleged that this
refusal resulted from a conspiracy by all the insurance companies in restraint of trade and
constituted an unlawful boycott in violation of the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 12.
15. 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
16. 555 F.2d at 13.
17. McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Royal Drug
Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1375
(5th Cir. 1977); Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 414 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'don
other grounds, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1977); Mathis v. Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp.
1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C.
1975), aff'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
18. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the Barry decision. 98 S. Ct. 391
(1977) (No. 77-240, 1977 Term). A decision on the merits may resolve the split in the circuits.
Among the questions presented to the Court was the following:
Should the First Circuit's novel and broad interpretation of the boycott exception to
the McCarran-Ferguson Act antitrust exemption be allowed to prevail in the face of its
admitted conflict with "a formidable array of authorities," including at least two
different but narrower constructions of the boycott exception adopted by four other
courts of appeals?
[1977] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCII) 60,021, at 65,106.
19. The exception is worded so as to proscribe any agreement or act that involves a
boycott, coercion, or intimidation. See § 1013(b), quoted in note I supra.
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applicability. In denying the benefit of the exception to an insurance
company which sought to restrain another insurer from persuading custom-
ers to switch their business, the court stated:
It would seem that the Congress, when enacting the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act, was concerned with an activity which is not here indicated.
The legislative history shows that the boycott, coercion and intimida-
tion exception, was placed in the legislation to protect insurance agents
from the issuance by insurance companies of a "black-list," which
would name companies or agents which were beyond the pale.20
As authority for its conclusions, the court cited a single page from the
Congressional Record. 21 That reference is to the remarks of a lone congress-
man who discussed blacklisting as an example of insurance company over-
reaching, 22 and who later expressed his intention to vote against the McCar-
ran Act. 23 Although the legislative history does evidence a concern by some
congressmen for the problem of blacklisting, 24 there is no hint that correct-
ing such a limited class of abuses was the sole purpose of the Act. Indeed,
the Transnational court ignored contrary remarks by both sponsors of the
legislation 25 and the House committee report,26 which discuss the boycott
exception in unrestricted terms. Clearly, the basis in the legislative history
for the court's narrow interpretation is tenuous at best.27
The Barry court refused to embark on an examination of the legislative
history because it deemed such an inquiry inappropriate where the statutory
language was clear. 28 However, contrary to the suggestion in Barry, the
terms "boycott, coercion, or intimidation" are not self-explanatory, and
therefore, in applying them, the courts must be guided by some sense of the
legislative intent behind the McCarran Act. If too comprehensive a defini-
20. 261 F. Supp. at 26.
21. Id. at 27.
22. 91 CONG. REc. 1087 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
23. Id. 1088.
24. See also id. 1485-86 (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney).
25. Id. 1443 (remarks of Sens. McCarran and Ferguson). Senator Ferguson states his
interpretation of the boycott exception in unrestricted terms: "There are certain things which a
State cannot interfere with. It cannot interfere with the application of the Sherman Act to any
agreement to boycott, coerce or intimidate, or an act of boycotting, coercion, or intimidation."
Id.
26. H.R. REP. No. 143, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1945] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 670,
672.
27. While arguing for a restrictive interpretation of the boycott exception, the dissenting
judge in Barry could not find conclusive support for the Transnational interpretation in the
legislative history of the McCarran Act: "[L]ike most legislative history, it is capable of being
argued both ways depending on which legislator one reads and to whose views one ascribes
final authority." 555 F.2d at 15 (Campbell, J., dissenting in part).
28. The court felt that the probing of legislative history was proper only if the statutory
language were ambiguous or if a literal reading would produce "a senseless or unworkable
statute." 555 F.2d at 7.
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tion is used, federal antitrust policy would displace a significant proportion
of state insurance regulations. 29 Some courts have therefore expressed the
concern that any expansion of the boycott exception beyond blacklisting
would "vitiate" 30 or "emasculate" 31 the general antitrust exemption. For
this reason, several courts have adopted the Transnational analysis32 despite
its tenuous legislative moorings, its appearance more than twenty years after
the enactment of the McCarran Act, and the fact that it was clearly dicta to
the Transnational court's holding.
33
These objections cannot be lightly dismissed. The Transnational
analysis has the advantage of providing well-defined limitations on the role
of federal law in the insurance area. A broader application of federal
antitrust laws to the insurance industry would undoubtedly encroach upon
certain prerogatives that the states have heretofore enjoyed. 34 However,
discarding the Transnational restrictions would hardly render the McCarran
Act an impotent piece of legislation. There are definite bounds beyond
which the boycott exception cannot extend. 35 Specifically, the exception
applies only to those acts or agreements that amount to a boycott, coercion,
or intimidation and violate the Sherman Act; other federal antitrust laws and
29. For example, industry rating bureaus or other concerted pricing arrangements are often
mandated or permitted by state statute, see, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1850-1860.3 (West 1972);
FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 627.011-.391 (West 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.1-.35
(Smith-Hurd 1965); N.Y. INS. LAw art. VIII, §§ 180-189 (McKinney 1966), yet such arrange-
ment might amount to price fixing or a boycott of certain consumers in violation of the Sherman
Act. See Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time forProcompetitive Reform, supra note 7,
at 1287-91. Similarly, insurance policy cancellations permitted by state statute, see, e.g., N.Y.
INS. LAW art. VIII, § 168 (McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-60 (1975), might also amount
to a boycott of certain consumers in violation of the federal antitrust laws.
30. Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725, 729 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975). Persons applying for low-interest home owner
loans from Equitable were pressured to purchase at the same time relatively high cost life
insurance as a condition to getting the loan. The court held this not to be the type of coercion
excepted by § 1013(b) of the McCarran Act.
31. Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975). Two automobile
owners challenged the refusal of auto insurers to sell them a policy at a rate lower than that set
in accordance with a uniform rate classification system adopted by the state of Texas. They
alleged that the refusal to deal on terms other than the uniform rate was an illegal boycott. A
narrow definition of boycott avoided the necessity of resolving a conflict between the state
regulation and the Sherman Act.
32. See cases cited in note 17 supra; Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the
United States, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975), Meicler v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975).
33. Even assuming that the boycott exception was applicable, the court determined that
"there is absolutely nothing in this record which would indicate a boycott, coercion or intimida-
tion." 261 F. Supp. at 27.
34. See note 29 supra.
35. 555 F.2d at 8. The Barry court noted that state tax and regulatory programs are still
shielded from attacks based on the dormant commerce clause and that the business of insurance
is protected from many federal regulatory programs. Id. at 8-9.
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other types of violations remain inapplicable to the insurance industry. 36
Therefore, adoption of a broad interpretation of the statutory language
would not necessarily be contrary to the Act's general policy of encouraging
state regulation-it would simply put some limit on the permissible scope of
such legislation. The extent to which state regulation would be affected
depends largely upon what activities may be subsumed under the terms
"boycott, coercion, or intimidation."
The Transnational formulation cannot be supported by the legislative
history of the McCarran Act or by the policy behind the boycott exception.
One pre-Transnational commentator stated: "The primary reason for this
exception was to insure that the safeguards provided by the 'core' of the
Sherman Act were maintained." 37 A more literal reading of its terms and a
straightforward application of the exception would effectuate that intent by
maintaining federal antitrust control over a broader class of insurance
abuses. The ability of the states to fulfill their regulatory function and
combat anticompetitive practices in the industry has been sharply ques-
tioned. 38 The McCarran Act's commitment of the business of insurance to
state regulation should be balanced against the need for stronger federal
antitrust enforcement. Rather than rely upon a discredited legislative his-
tory, any limitations on the intrusion of antitrust law into the insurance area
must be based on the necessity of accommodating state regulation. With the
demise of Transnational, the courts must develop new, less mechanistic
standards upon which to ascertain the proper scope of the boycott exception.
II. BARRY AND BEYOND: TOWARD A NEW STANDARD
FOR APPLYING THE BOYCOTT EXCEPTION
In bluntly rejecting the qualifications imposed upon the boycott excep-
tion by Transnational and its progeny,39 the Barry decision immediately
raises the question of what new standards should be adopted by the courts.
The Barry court failed to consider adequately the possible consequences of
an overbroad application of the exception. If the McCarran Act's policy
favoring state regulation is to be respected, the boycott exception must not
be applied in such a way as to destroy such regulation!n0
36. Id. at 8. For example, predatory pricing would still be an exempted violation although it
might be illegal under state law.
37. Note, Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, supra note 2,
at 1103 (footnote omitted).
38. See Freed, supra note 8, at 1 col. 6 & 16 col. 1; cf., Note, Insurance Regulation and
Antitrust Exemptions: McCarran-Ferguson, the Boycott Exception, and the Public Interest,
supra note 7, at 140, 143, 156-57 (1973) (states have failed to use effectively their regulatory
power). See also R. KEETON, supra note 6, at 540.
39. 555 F.2d at 7.
40. Repealing the McCarran Act antitrust exemption completely would not render all forms
of state regulation of insurance violative of the antitrust laws. The states would still have the
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The impact of the boycott exception as a means of expanding federal
antitrust regulation of the insurance industry depends on how broadly the
statutory terms are defined. The most important operative term is "boy-
cott," yet an appropriate definition is elusive. Several formulations will be
examined as possible approaches to the problem. The first is the broad
definition of boycott which is generally applied under the antitrust laws and
which was adopted by the Barry court. The second formulation is a more
restrictive definition, advocated by some commentators, which would care-
fully define "boycott" in terms of its effect upon competitors and would
apply a per se rule against such conduct. A third alternative, expressed by
the District of Columbia Circuit in Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. ,41 would require some form of "enforcement activi-
ty" by the insurers before their concerted actions would be deemed a
boycott under the McCarran Act. Finally, it is suggested that the most
appropriate interpretation of the boycott exception can be found by examin-
ing the policies behind the McCarran Act: those concerted actions by
insurers which do not further the legitimate purposes of the Act should not
be shielded from antitrust attack.
A. The Barry Formulation.
In interpreting the McCarran Act boycott exception, the Barry court
declined to adopt a narrow or special meaning for the terms as used in that
statute. Instead, relying on general antitrust case law, it defined "boycott"
as "a 'concerted refusal to deal' with a disfavored purchaser or seller.' 42
benefit of the so-called "state action" exemption enunciated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943). An analysis of this doctrine and its development is beyond the scope of this Note, see
Comment, The State Action Exemption in Antitrust: From Parker v. Brown to Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 1977 DUKE L.J. 871, but in light of the Court's recent decision in Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), it seems apparent that only those few states in which a
state official sets insurance rates, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 5.01, 5.25 & 5.55 (Vernon
1963) (automobile, fire and allied lines, and workmen's compensation insurance) can be confi-
dent their regulatory program is within the Parker exemption. Johnson, supra note 7, at 25.
41. 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
42. 555 F.2d at 7 (citing Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)). The
Barry court was not the first to suggest that the boycott exception should be applied in a
straightforward manner, but previous statements to that effect have been dicta. In a pre-
Transnational opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the boycott
exception to provide that "all boycotts or agreements to boycott condemned by the Sherman
Act are rendered subject to federal law .. "Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life
Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964). However, the issue
before the court was whether a private treble damage action was available, and the alleged
illegal conduct was directed at another insurance company, not a policyholder. 326 F.2d at 842.
A recent court opinion determined that .'boycott' in the [McCarran] Act means the same
as it does in antitrust law generally," Professional Adjusting Systems of America, Inc. v.
General Adjusting Bureau, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 35, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), but the conduct at issue
would have fit the Transnational blacklisting definition. See also Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Cooperativa De
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Although the definitions of boycotts articulated by the Supreme Court43 and
other courts' imply that boycotts are primarily directed by one group of
businesses against another business or group of businesses,4 5 the Barry
court rejected this restriction and included actions directed at consumers.46
The court clearly felt that the type of activity involved in Barry47 ought
not to be protected by the McCarran Act, and the definition of "boycott"
which it adopted was broadly stated to encompass the fact situation at hand.
The Barry formulation, however, is essentially unbounded-all concerted
refusals to deal are condemned. The problem with this formulation is that
the legislative history of the McCarran Act reveals that the Congress did not
intend to prohibit all agreements among insurers which could conceivably
be subsumed under the elastic phrase, "concerted refusal to deal." Indeed,
the Act specifically provided for a three year suspension of the antitrust
laws' application to the business of insurance to give the states an opportuni-
ty, in the words of the House committee report, "to permit agreements and
contracts by insurance companies which otherwise might be in violation of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts.'"48 To the extent the states enacted legisla-
Seguros Multiples De Puerto Rico v. San Juan, 294 F. Supp. 627 (D.P.R. 1968) ("Boycott" in
McCarran Act not narrower than under Sherman Act; boycott alleged against insurance
company, not policyholder).
43. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) ("concerted
refusals by traders to deal with other traders").
44. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274,
282 (D. Mont. 1958) (" 'concerted refrainment from business relations with another' ") (quoting
W.E. Anderson Sons Co. v. Local Union 311, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 156 Ohio St. 541, 561,
104 N.E.2d 22, 32-33 (1952)).
45. As the Barry court noted, the reluctance to label other conduct a "boycott" may stem
from the Supreme Court's holding in KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959) that group boycotts are per se illegal. The solution, the court suggests, is not artificially
to restrict the meaning of "boycott" but rather to recognize that some boycotts may not be
anticompetitive and should not be judged under a per se rule. 555 F.2d at 8 n.4. See P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 371 at 380-81 (2d ed. 1974); notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text.
46. 555 F.2d at 7 n.4. Under the Transnational doctrine, insurance consumers were not
afforded relief under the boycott exception. The lower court in Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 372 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975), asserted: "Neither
party has cited nor can this Court locate any decision applying § 1013(b) in the context of an
alleged combination of insurance companies to boycott, coerce, or intimidate policyholders at
large." 372 F. Supp. at 514 n.9. Yet the same court, in discussing the consumer allegations of
price-fixing, could observe: "It cannot be disputed that the terms boycott and coercion, as
commonly defined, might be construed to encompass the type of activity attributed to [the
insurers] in the instant case." Id. at 513. In the absence of the Transnational limitations, the
Meicler court would apparently have been receptive to consumer challenges to industry price-
fixing schemes.
47. Barry essentially involved an agreement to divide the market. See note 13 supra; text
accompanying note 90 infra.
48. H.R. REP. No. 143, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1945] U.S. CODE CoNo. SERV. 670,
672. In a similar vein, Senator O'Mahoney remarked that under the Act "there are certain
agreements which can normally be made in the insurance business which are in the public
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tion in this moratorium period which regulated such concerted conduct, that
conduct became exempt from the antitrust laws under the McCarran Act.4 9
The most obvious example of the type of agreement Congress intended
to permit is concerted uniform rate-making by insurance companies through
rating bureaus licensed and regulated by the states.50 Under this arrange-
ment, the bureau determines premium rates based on data supplied by its
members and then files the rates with the state insurance commissioner.
Members and subscribers to the bureau are required to comply with the filed
rates. 51 Under the broad definition of boycott adopted by the Barry court,
such price fixing agreements could well be deemed to constitute a "concert-
ed refusal to deal" with insurance consumers except at the prevailing
rates .52
It seems clear that the definition of boycott should not be structured in
such a way as to preclude rate fixing and other types of concerted behavior
which Congress intended to permit. The difficulty with relying solely upon
general antitrust law is that a precise definition of boycott does not exist.
The reison for this may be that antitrust analysis focuses on the anticompeti-
tive purposes and effects of conduct without any need to label it. 53 The
interest, but which might conceivably be a violation of the antitrust law, which prohibits
combinations and agreements in restraint of trade." 91 CONG. REC. 1444 (1945).
49. See notes 1, 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
50. The insurance industry has consistently maintained that the antitrust laws are inapprop-
riate for rate-setting and other industry practices. During congressional hearings on the McCar-
ran Act, one industry spokesman vigorously defended this position in the following terms:
[C]ooperation in arriving at the proper rate which is to cover the hazard or the risk to
be insured is absolutely essential if a rate anywhere nearly correctly measuring that
hazard is to be developed.
The application of the Sherman Act to insurance rate-making procedure [sic]
would destroy practically all cooperative rate-making machinery no matter how effi-
ciently and how fairly such machinery functions in the public interest . . . .The
destruction of all this rating machinery . . . would encourage indiscriminate rating
practices which might ruin many companies and cause great loss to policyholders.
Insurance: Joint Hearing on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270 Before the Subcomms. of the
Comms. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 219-20 (1943) (statement of A.V. Gruhn). See
also R. KEETON, supra note 6, at 559-60; Note, Insurance Regulation and Antitrust Exemp-
tions: McCarran-Ferguson, the Boycott Exception, and the Public Interest, supra note 7, at
142-43. Congress apparently agreed. Senator Ferguson, a sponsor of the bill, remarked: "I
think that under this bill [the state legislatures] could allow a rate-making bureau. . . to fix the
rates [for insurance premiums]." 91 CONG. REC. 1484 (1945); accord, id. 1483 (remarks of Sen.
O'Mahoney) ("The State may authorize agreements for rate making [of insurance premiums]
just as the Congress. . .authorized rate making by combinations in the railroad field .. ").
51. Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive Reform, supra note 7,
at 1287-91.
52. At least one court has held that for McCarran Act purposes, a concerted refusal to deal
except at a fixed price is the same as a concerted absolute refusal to deal. California League of
Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
53. See generally P. AREEDA, supra note 45, at 370, at 380; L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 68, 70 (1977).
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terminology generally associated with boycotts-'"concerted refusal to
deal"-is overbroad in the context of the McCarran Act because it may
reach justifiable insurance company agreements.
B. The Sullivan Definition.
Professor Sullivan has criticized the classic definition of a boycott-
"concerted refusal to deal"--as "too imprecise to be very useful as a legal
category." 54 It is, he observes, at the same time too narrow and too broad: it
does not reach all conduct which has the elements of boycott, and it includes
concerted refusals to deal which have purposes other than the exclusion of
competitors. 55 For that reason, Sullivan would carefully define a boycott in
such a way that the term would only include actions directed by businesses
against a competitor. According to Sullivan, boycott law deals with concert-
ed efforts by traders at one level to keep others out or inhibit their competi-
tive efforts at that level by making it more difficult for them to meet their
needs for customers, suppliers, or access to transactions with other traders at
the same level.56 Using this restrictive definition, Sullivan would hold that
all "explicit boycotts'"-where the perpetrators agree not to deal with the
victims or demand that others not deal with the victims-should be per se
unlawful. 57 This approach would exclude from the term "boycott" conduct
directed at consumers. It must be noted, however, that this definition was
developed only for the purpose of determining when to apply a per se rule.58
Sullivan's approach in no way implies that other agreements, including
those directed against consumers, are permitted by the antitrust laws; it
merely requires that they not be adjudged per se unlawful. 59
Sullivan's restrictive definition should not be used to determine the
scope of the McCarran Act boycott exception. His analysis deals with the
question of when to apply a per se rule to concerted actions. That question is
quite different from the question of whether to scrutinize an activity at all
under the antitrust laws, and the two require different definitional standards.
The word "boycott" does not appear anywhere in the Sherman Act, section 1 of which
speaks only of "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade .... " 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
54. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 53, at § 83, at 231.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 83, at 232.
57. Id. § 85, at 241, § 86, at 241 n.1.
58. Id. § 90, at 256.
59. If the per se rule respecting boycotts is to become coherent, we must recognize that it
applies only where competitors engage together to inhibit others with whom they
compete . . . .This is not to say that other concerted refusals may not be illegal;
many will be, some of them plainly so. It is only to insist that we look at the others,
each for what it is, and do not suppose that as some distant relative of the classic
boycott it must be cursed with the same baleful characteristics.
Id. § 90, at 259.
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As the Barry court noted, 60 there is no policy justification for a highly
restrictive interpretation of the boycott exception-one which would ex-
clude concerted actions directed at insurance consumers. Ultimately, the
antitrust laws are designed to protect consumers and society as a whole from
abusive business practices. To apply the boycott exception only when
abuses are directed at competitors would have the anomalous effect of
protecting consumers when they are injured indirectly through the elimina-
tion of competition, but not when they are the direct objects of abuse. 61
It is particularly significant that the Supreme Court case which pre-
cipitated the passage of the McCarran Act, United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association,62 involved, in part, an insurer boycott against
consumers. In that case, the Court held that the antitrust laws were applica-
ble to a conspiracy in which an association of insurance companies "em-
ployed boycotts together with other types of coercion and intimidation...
to compel persons who needed insurance to buy only from [association]
members on [association] terms. '"63 The association's scheme directed
against insurance consumers was found to violate the federal antitrust laws.
This holding clearly implied that insurance would be fully subject to
the federal antitrust laws. In order to obviate that implication and to re-
establish the primacy of state regulation, the McCarran Act was swiftly
adopted by Congress. 64 Even though the Act substantially diminished the
impact of South-Eastern Underwriters, it did not completely nullify the
Court's decision. The terms of the boycott exception-'"boycott, coercion
or intimidation" 65-are the same as the language used by the Court. This
suggests that Congress intended to preserve the Court's holding that insur-
ance company boycotts are subject to federal antitrust scrutiny notwithstand-
ing the general McCarran Act exemption. 66 The boycott in South-Eastern
60. 555 F.2d at 8 n.4.
61. As the Barry court noted, id., at least one court of appeals previously determined that a
boycott of customers may be violative of the antitrust laws. Washington State Bowling Proprie-
tors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371,376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966).
The finding that a state bowling association boycotted non-member bowling establishments was
based, in part, on allegations that the association restricted eligibility to participate in its
tournaments to customers of member establishments.
62. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Court held, for the first time, that the insurance business
involved interstate commerce and, thus, was subject to federal antitrust laws.
63. Id. at 535.
64. See R. KEETON, supra note 6, at 538.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970).
66. See Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 11 (1st Cir. 1977). In fact,
Congress first considered bills which would have provided a complete 'exemption for the
insurance industry from the Sherman and Clayton Acts before passing the McCarran-Ferguson
Act in its final form. The first of these complete exemption bills, H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1943), proposed by the insurance companies themselves, was passed by the House of
Representatives seventeen days after the Southeastern Underwriters decision, 90 CONG. REc.
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Underwriters was directed at consumers of insurance. It would therefore
seem appropriate to include such conduct within the boycott exception. In
the words of the District of Columbia Circuit, it is "hard to believe that
Congress would have intended a construction of the boycott provision which
excludes from its sweep activities explicitly addressed in the case from
which its language is drawn." 67 This would render untenable any interpreta-
tion of the boycott exception so narrow as to exclude boycotts of insurance
consumers. Finally, as the Barry court pointed out, the boycott exception
was conceived of as an "all purpose safety valve." 68 "Time after time the
concerns of the skeptics and opponents were met by reference to this
provision. We cannot imagine that they would have been at all satisfied if
they had understood that 'boycott' was a code word confined to industry
personnel. "69
C. Proctor.
The Proctor court also has attempted to delineate the scope of the
boycott exception. In that case, decided one month after Barry and appar-
ently without any knowledge of that decision, 70 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia rejected the narrow Transnational interpretation of the
boycott exception. In so doing, the court noted:
Although we recognize that the terms of the [boycott] provision are not
self-defining, and are capable of being read in such a way as to swallow
the antitrust exemption, we do not think the solution is to restrict the
boycott exception in a manner unsupported by its plain language, its
legislative history, or the historical context in which it was passed. 7'
Although the court concluded on the particular facts of Proctor that
there was no evidence of a boycott, its analysis of what constitutes a boycott
is quite helpful. The court recognized the potential abuses of a broader
interpretation of the boycott exception and attempted to establish limitations
to prevent them. Thus, the court concluded that "the terms [of the boycott
exception] must be applied in such a way as to accommodate the respective
purposes of the Act's antitrust exemption, on the one hand, and the boycott
exception to that exemption, on the other. '72
6565 (1944), but was passed over by the Senate, 90 CONG. REC. 8054 (1944). The final bill
therefore represented a compromise, "preserving state regulation, [and] at the same time not
emasculating Federal Anti-trust laws." NATIONAL Assoc. OF INS. COMM'RS, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SEVENTY-SixTH ANNUAL SESSION 143 (1945) (statement of NAIC President Johnson).
67. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
68. 555 F.2d at 12.
69. Id.
70. Neither of the opinions in Proctor cites Barry.
71. 561 F.2d at 274.
72. Id.
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In Proctor, the owners of automobile repair shops alleged that a group
of insurers sought to fix repair prices, coerced and intimidated repair shops
to enforce the fixed prices, and boycotted those shops which did not adhere
to them. 73 The court was required to determine whether the boycott excep-
tion should be interpreted broadly enough to make these allegations cogniz-
able under the Sherman Act. The district court had followed the Transna-
tional analysis in determining that the insurers' actions were not subject to
federal sanction. 74 The court of appeals, however, emphasized the role of
the South-Eastern Underwriters decision in precipitating passage of the
McCarran Act. Noting that South-Eastern Underwriters was the apparent
source of the boycott exception language, the court concluded that that
decision should provide a "useful guidepost" 75 to determine the scope of
the exception. Although the court of appeals in Proctor admitted that "a
simple agreement among insurance companies to charge certain premium
rates could be viewed as a boycott agreement," 76 it interpreted the holding
in South-Eastern Underwriters to require a higher level of coercive behav-
ior on the part of the companies. Its analysis was guided by both the facts in
South-Eastern Underwriters and the need to accommodate state regulation.
Thus, the court stated:
Since the McCarran Act was passed in response to South-Eastern
Underwriters, and since a construction of the boycott provision to
encompass a simple rate-fixing agreement would indeed emasculate the
Act's antitrust exemption, it is reasonable to infer that in a rate-setting
context something in the way of enforcement activity would be required
to make out a claim of "boycott, coercion, or intimidation" within the
meaning of the Act.77
The court concluded that the allegations of a group boycott directed against
repair shops involved sufficient "enforcement activity" to "state a claim
within the boycott exception. "78
Although the Proctor court properly recognized the need to place
limitations upon the scope of the boycott exception, its "enforcement
activity" formulation is an elusive norm by which to test concerted behavior
by insurers. There are degrees of enforcement which may be apparent, even
73. Id. at 264-65.
74. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd on
other grounds, 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
75. 561 F.2d at 274.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 275. The court believed that the collective refusal to permit policyholders to use
their reimbursement checks at repair shops other than preferred ones unnecessarily penalized
nonfavored shops and stifled competition. However, the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court decision on the ground that the record did not support the allegations. Id. at 276.
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without a complete refusal to deal on the part of insurance companies. In
Proctor, the court stated that insurance companies could properly establish a
uniform formula to determine repair rates and could establish arrangements
with those preferred repair shops that would accept the uniform rates as full
payment. 79 Even though other repair shops "would be under economic
pressure to accede to the terms of the horizontal agreements and thereby
achieve favored status," the court concluded that this arrangement did not
involve "the degree of coercive enforcement activity" necessary to consti-
tute a boycott. 80 This test appears to draw a line between absolute refusals to
deal, where the coercion is exclusion from the market, and refusals to deal
except on specific terms, where the coercion is only economic."1 But at
some point, mere economic pressure must rise to the level of enforcement.
If, in Barry, for example, the companies had charged doctors who switched
insurers twice the normal rate instead of refusing them insurance, then under
Proctor the companies would be exerting only economic pressure. 82 The
effect, however, is the same-consumers are denied a real choice in the
marketplace. A test which looks solely to the existence of "enforcement
activity" fails to address the effect of economic pressure. Thus, the test is
too narrow.
83
79. Id. at 274-75. It was the refusal to pay anything for repairs performed by nonpreferred
shops that the court found objectionable. Id.
80. Id. at 276.
81. The court cites Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1093 (1973), for the proposition that economic pressure is not "coercion" within the
meaning of the McCarran Act. In that case a private insurer alleged that Blue Cross coerced
hospitals into signing standard contracts at low rates by refusing to reimburse non-signing
hospitals for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers. The court held that this economic
pressure on hospitals was not actionable.
82. Perhaps this device could be dismissed as a sham, amounting to nothing more than an
absolute refusal to deal. However, lower sign-up fees would be more difficult to treat in this
fashion. Ultimately, one must look at effects, not just types of conduct.
83. This standard may also require courts to make very fine distinctions among degrees of
enforcement activity. The history of another enforcement doctrine illustrates the problem. In
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Court held that a manufacturer who
announces the prices at which he expects retailers to sell his products and implements that
pricing policy by refusing to deal with retailers who cut prices does not violate the Sherman
Act. Later cases made it clear, however, that the range of conduct permissible under Colgate
was quite narrow. For example, the Act was violated if attempts were made to police a resale
price maintenance policy by coding shipments to permit tracing back to offenders, Federal
Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (192), or by cutting off wholesal-
ers who sold to price-cutting retailers, United States v. Bpusch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S.
707 (1943), accord, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1959). The facts of these
later cases do not in any realistic sense show greater coercion of retailers or more clearly
evidence an agreement to fix prices than do the facts of Colgate. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 53,
at § 139, at 394. Thus, application of the Colgate test became difficult and strained because the




D. A Proposed Alternative-A Functional Definition.
Because no general definition of boycott is adequate, it would seem
appropriate to rely directly upon the purposes of the McCarran Act in
construing the boycott exception. Only those concerted refusals to deal
which are in conflict with the legitimate purposes of the Act should be
deemed boycotts subject to federal antitrust law. In other words, a boycott in
this context is a concerted refusal to deal, the effect of which is inconsistent
with the intended purposes of the McCarran Act. Inherent in such a defini-
tion is a theory of "ancillary restraints" and "less restrictive alterna-
tives. "84 In scrutinizing a particular concerted action by insurers, the courts
must deal with two distinct questions. First, it must be determined whether
the concerted behavior of insurers is ancillary to a legitimate goal under the
McCarran Act.8 5 For example, the concerted behavior involved in rate
fixing may be ancillary to the legislative goal of keeping insurance costs
down and avoiding insurer insolvency resulting from excessive competition.
Even if the concerted action has many of the characteristics of a classic
boycott, it should not be prohibited if it is a reasonable means to effect a
legitimate purpose under the Act's antitrust exemption. Secondly, the courts
should consider whether a less restrictive alternative to the concerted behav-
ior would be adequate to effectuate the legislative purpose. An insurer
agreement should not be protected from the antitrust laws if policy objec-
tives can be achieved by a means which is clearly less anticompetitive in its
effect.
Proctor is particularly helpful in understanding this proposed approach
because, although the court phrased its definition in terms of "enforcement
activity," much of its analysis is consistent with the proposed functional
approach. The court viewed the goal of the alleged concerted behavior to be
the legitimate purpose of "controlling their spiraling claims payments.'"86
Moreover, the court essentially adopted a theory of a "less restrictive
84. These two concepts are familiar ones in antitrust analysis. The legality of ancillary
restraints derives from the common law. See United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899). The search for less restrictive alternatives is part of the rule of reason analysis. See
P. AREEDA, supra note 45, at 349(b)(3). See generally Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
85. The apparent goals of the McCarran Act are to permit concerted activity to protect the
insurance fund so that policyholders can be assured that the insurer will be able to pay his
obligations. This includes the sharing of loss experience and joint rate making to prevent rate
wars, rate discrimination and insufficient loss reserves. See notes 50-51 supra and accompany-
ing text.
It has been suggested that the McCarran Act antitrust exemption is unnecessary to protect
the practice of pooling loss experience since the joint use of common experience would not
violate the Sherman Act. Johnson, supra note 7, at 27.
86. 561 F.2d at 276.
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alternative" in drawing a line between the types of activity that would and
would not be permitted. The court stated that it would be permissible for
insurance companies to enter into a horizontal agreement to reimburse
insureds according to a common formula and to make arrangements with
preferred shops. However, a refusal by the companies to allow policyhold-
ers to use their reimbursement checks at "nonpreferred" shops would not be
permissible.8 7 The court then went on to discuss the unnecessarily restrictive
effects of a total refusal to deal:
Whereas the former merely exerts economic pressure on the shops, the
latter unnecessarily penalized nonfavored shops, and stifles any mar-
ket pressure in the direction of increased prices by preventing policy-
holders from dealing with shops which charge more than the prevailing
rate. Moreover, in the latter situation, legitimate increases in the actual
labor rate are less likely to get reflected in the amounts paid by the
insurance companies, and the profit margins of even the preferred
shops might get squeezed unfairly. 8
Although the court characterized the distinction between permissible and
impermissible action as the amount of enforcement, it seems that the court
was far less concerned with how "coercive" the insurance companies'
actions were than it was with the anticompetitive effects of those actions.
A functional definition of "boycott" is also consistent with statements
in the legislative history. Senator O'Mahoney, who was on the conference
committee, stated:
[M]y judgment is that every effective combination or agreement to
carry out a program against the public interest of which I have had any
knowledge in this whole insurance study would be prohibited by the
[boycott] section. . . .There are agreements and combinations in the
public interests [sic] which can safely be permitted .... 89
Senator O'Mahoney's concept of a boycott, then, is a combination "against
the public interest." With the modification that the "public interest" be
examined in the context of the purposes of the McCarran Act, this is
essentially the test that is being proposed here.
This functional definition may be applied to the facts in Barry. The
concerted behavior alleged in Barry involved a division of the malpractice
insurance market among a group of insurance companies by preventing their
customers from switching insurers. Physicians who were dissatisfied with
their malpractice coverage were prevented from switching their business to
another insurer. Each insurer, therefore, was free to alter the terms of its
coverage without fear of losing customers to its competitors who might offer
87. Id. at 274-75.
88. Id. at 275.
89. 91 CONG. REC. 1486 (1945).
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their own insureds more desirable terms. 9O This arrangement essentially
constituted a market division; the companies agreed to divide the market
according to the then existing distribution of customers and not to compete
in each other's markets. This type of market division eliminates all competi-
tion and is thereby one of the most restrictive forms of anticompetitive
behavior. 91 It is difficult to find any legitimate purpose embodied in the
McCarran Act which would be advanced by such an agreement. Conceiv-
ably, the insurance companies might argue that their arrangement would
lower costs by avoiding the "start-up" costs associated with new accounts.
Even if that argument is accepted, the market division should be prohibited
because there are other less restrictive alternatives-such as a temporary
surcharge for new accounts-which would fulfill the same purpose. 92 The
boycott exception should open the insurers' actions to scrutiny under the
federal antitrust laws because their concerted refusal to deal with the poten-
tial customers does not comport with the purposes of the antitrust exemption
of the McCarran Act.
An evaluation of the Act's purposes and of the alternative means of
achieving those purposes is essentially a "rule of reason" analysis. 93 This
attempt to delineate the scope of the boycott exception requires the courts to
determine whether a particular concerted action is "reasonable" in light of
its purposes and alternatives. Although the appropriate analysis may often
be difficult, this approach is preferable because no other definition of
boycott is adequate to preserve the competing purposes of the antitrust
exemption. The courts must look toward the McCarran Act itself to deter-
mine what concerted behavior otherwise illegal under the antitrust laws is
consistent with the Act's goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under Transnational, the potential impact of the boycott exception to
the McCarran Act has been stifled by an artificially restrictive interpretation
90. 555 F.2d at 5.
91. Compare United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), where a group of
25 regional supermarket chains formed a cooperative private label association. Each member
was assigned an exclusive territory in which to market Topco brand products. Members were
free to expand into other members' territories but could not sell the Topco brand there.
Although less restrictive than an absolute territorial division, the Court struck it down as an
impermissible per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. But see United States v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371
U.S. 296 (1963) (absolute territorial division by joint venturers entering market in which neither
had previously operated held not unlawful, at least for initial period of venture).
92. The danger of a sham barrier to transfers still exists, see note 82 supra, but placing the
burden on the company to defend this suspect practice with supporting cost data would meet
the problem. Only a surcharge in the amount of actual extra cost would be justified.
93. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 53, at § 65, at 172 for a discussion of the application of the
rule of reason to evaluate the legality of concerted arrangements.
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of its provisions. The decision in Barry, by revitalizing the boycott excep-
tion, opens the insurance industry to increased federal antitrust regulation.
However, the Barry court failed to recognize adequately the need to accom-
modate the McCarran Act's policy of deference to state insurance regula-
tion. The meaning of "boycott" within the McCarran Act must be carefully
formulated to prevent the boycott exception from displacing the Act's
antitrust exemption for the business of insurance. By evaluating the pur-
poses behind the Act and the anticompetitive effects of alternative means to
achieve those purposes, the courts can best determine what concerted
practices should be subject to federal antitrust law as a prohibited boycott.
Even with these limitations, a broader interpretation of the boycott
exception may have a significant impact on practices affecting insurance
consumers. State regulatory systems have often inadequately protected the
public and have fostered anticompetitive practices in the insurance industry.
The public interest may be better served with a more generous application of
federal antitrust policy to the business of insurance.
